THE GENERAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE:
FCC SPECTRUM TRAFFIC COP OR BROKER?
Tara Susan Becht

The Communications Act of 19341 ("Communications Act") charges the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") with the responsibility of ensuring that the electronic spectrum
is used in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.2 In so charging, Section 303 of the Communications Act requires the
Commission to "[c]lassify radio stations . . . [and]
[pirescribe the nature of service to be rendered by
each class."' "An important element of public interest and convenience affecting the issue of a license is
the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the community . . .When determining whether a service is within the
public interest, convenience, and necessity, the Commission must examine services proposed for the electronic spectrum and determine the composition of the
traffic on the airways.5 Until recently, the Commission allocated frequency bands for specific services.'
Only after allocating the bands did the Commission
issue licenses. The Commission's new trend is to
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1994).

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), (b), (c), (n) (1994)(amended
1988); see also Black River Valley Broadcasters, Inc. v. McNinch, 101 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied 307
U.S. 623 (1939).
' 47 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b) (1994).
4
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
2

(1940).
" National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,

216 (1943).
" "[T]elevision broadcasting occupies 402 [MHz in various
locations of the 54-806 MHz band; FM Radio occupies 20
MHz in the 88-108 MHz band; cellular occupies 50 MHz in
the 824-849 and 869-894 MHz bands; licensed broadband PCS
[is] allocated 120 MHz in the 1850-1990 MHz band." Kurt A.
Wimmer & Lee J. Tiedrich, Competitive Bidding and Personal
Communications Services: A New Paradigm for FCC Licensing,
3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 17, 19 (1995).

' "Fixed service" is defined by the Commission as a radio
communication service between specified fixed points. See In re
Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Government Use, Second Report and Order in ET Dkt. No. 94-32,
FCC 95-319, para. 61 (Aug. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Second Re-

grant licenses, through competitive bidding, without
defining a specific service the licensee is required to
provide.
On August 2, 1995, the Commission created the
General
Wireless
Communications
Service
("GWCS"); GWCS is defined as any Fixed7 or Mo-

bile services8 that are not Broadcast, Radiolocation,'
or Satellite services (including Mobile Satellite service). 1" The Commission assigned this new service to
the 4660-4685 MHz band, which had been recently
reallocated from government use to the private sector. Licenses for GWCS will be awarded through
the competitive bidding process."
This Comment examines the Commission's decision to create the GWCS, its decision to award licenses for the service by auction and whether by doing so, it has impermissibly delegated its authority to
control the spectrum to the private sector. Part I discusses the reallocation of the 4660-4685 MHz band
from government use to the private sector and includes a brief history of competitive bidding. Part II
port and Order].
8 Section 153(n) of the Communications Act defines Mobile
Service as "a radio communication service carried on between
mobile stations or receivers and land stations, and by mobile stations communicating among themselves, and includes both oneway and two-way radio communication services." 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(n) (1994).
9 The Commission defines Radiolocation as "Radiodetermination used for purposes other than those of radio navigation" and Radiodetermination as "the determination of position, or the obtaining of information relating to position, by
means of the propagation of radio waves." 47 C.F.R. § 90.7
(1994).

10 In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred
from Government Use, First Report and Order and Second No-

tice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 4769, para. 46
(1995) [hereinafter First Report and Order and Second
NPRM].
" The GWCS spectrum is scheduled to be auctioned in the
third quarter of 1996. FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Remarks
at a VIP Luncheon of Phillips Business Information, Inc. (Aug.
25, 1995) (transcript available in the FCC's library).
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examines the process by which the Commission created the GWCS, the proposed rules, and comments
filed by various parties. Part III evaluates the Commission's rules in light of the Communications Act
and fundamental administrative law. This Comment
concludes that the Commission has impermissibly
delegated its authority to control the radio spectrum
to private entities. This Comment further concludes
that the Commission is establishing a dangerous precedent by awarding licenses by auction without first
assigning a specific service to the spectrum.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. Comparative Hearings, Random Selection, and
Competitive Bidding
Historically, when broadcast licenses were sought
by more than one party, the FCC conducted administrative hearings (comparative hearings) to determine which applicant would best serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In comparative
hearings, the Commission examined each applicant
and compared them based on the following criteria:
diversification of media control, integration of management and ownership, previous broadcast experience, character, financial capability and minority
ownership. 2 Comparative hearings were scrutinized
in the early 1980s because they were time consuming
and expensive for both the government and applicants.'" Commenters argued that comparative hearings "requir[e] hair-splitting speculative judgments
12 Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 18; see also supra
notes 3-4.
"s In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997 (1990),
the Court upheld the FCC's decision to grant preferences to applicants based on race, ethnicity or surname, but refused to rule
on its policy of preferring applicants based on sex. In 1992, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found the Commission's policy of awarding credits to women
was in violation of the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
"' Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 18 (citing Star Television, Inc., v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969)).
" See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1994). "Lotteries have been used
to issue licenses for cellular telephony, paging, low-power television, certain interactive video and data services ("IVDS") markets, and wireless voice and data transmission services." Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 18 n.10. The lottery process
implemented by the FCC was the standard lottery process. Id.
Each applicant was assigned a ping-pong ball (minority applicants received two balls if they were awarded a minority preference) and all of the balls were placed in a huge bin, similar to
that used in bingo. Id. The applicant whose ball was drawn
from the bin was awarded the license. Id.

about which applicant is most qualified. 1"

In response to the criticism surrounding the comparative hearing process, Congress authorized the
use of random selection (lotteries) to choose between
mutually exclusive applicants.'" Lotteries also
proved problematic. Parties often filed "cookie-cutter" applications to increase their chances of winning
licenses in order to sell the bare licenses and thereby
receive great windfalls. 6 An alternative method of
issuing licenses was needed.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993"1
("Budget Act") added Section 3090)18 to the Communications Act granting the Commission limited
authority to use competitive bidding (auctions) to
award licenses among mutually exclusive applicants.' 9 Before auctioning spectrum, the FCC must
first determine if there is a reasonable likelihood that
the principal use of the spectrum will involve subscriber-based services.20 Subscriber-based services are
those services where the licensee charges the subscriber for providing the service.2 ' The FCC's auctions mirror regular auctions by essentially awarding
licenses to the highest bidder.
B. Reallocation
Mandate

of Spectrum by Congressional

In 1993, Congress also determined that the FCC
has been forced to "postpone or forgo spectrum assignments for worthwhile uses and technologies" because of the limited unassigned, usable spectrum. 2
'6 Lotteries turned into a "get rich quick gimmick" for many
participants. People literally filed hundreds of cookie cutter ap-

plications (essentially identical applications with only a change
in name to throw off suspicion), won a license at no cost, and
then sold the license and received a huge windfall. Wimmer &
Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 19 (citing Kurt A. Wimmer, Netting
Federal Revenues from Thin Air: Issuing Spectrum Licenses by
Auction, COMM. LAw., Summer 1993, at 12).
" Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 388 (1993) (codified, in pertinent part, at 47

U.S.C. § 3090) (1994)).
's 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1994).
19 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(A).
20

Id.

21

Id.

The legislative history of the Reconciliation Act demonstrates that Congress was concerned with the affects of spectrum
congestion on emergency services. H.R. Rep. No. 111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 250 (1993). Specifically, Congress noted that
the FCC was forced to reallocate two MHz of spectrum that
had been utilized, on a secondary basis, by the Amateur Radio
Service. Id. The Amateur Radio Service had "established an impressive record of providing life-saving emergency communications during natural disasters and accidents, when more conven22
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The spectrum assigned to the private sector was inadequate to accommodate the demand."8 The "public
interest requires many of the reserved frequencies to
be utilized more efficiently by Government or commercial operators. "24 However, unlike the private
sector, the government never implemented procedures to ensure spectrum efficiency despite the fact
that nearly one half of the entire spectrum was reserved solely for government use.2 5 In 1993 Congress
put an end to this inefficiency by reclaiming portions
of the spectrum for non-government use.
The Reconciliation Act required the Secretary of
Commerce to identify 200 MHz of spectrum below 5
GHz presently allocated for government use that
could be allocated for non-government use.26 The
frequencies must be available to FCC licensees in at
least eighty percent of the United States, including as
many metropolitan areas as possible. The Reconciliation Act also required the Secretary to issue a
report within six months of its enactment, giving a
preliminary identification of reallocable spectrum
and identifying at least 50 MHz 28 of spectrum immediately available for reallocation.29 The remaining

reallocable spectrum must be made available within
ten years."0
The Secretary released its report making a preliminary identification of spectrum for reallocation on

tional methods of communications were rendered inoperable."
Id. Congress concluded that reallocating spectrum to the private
sector would alleviate spectrum congestion and the Commission
would not be forced to take more spectrum from the Amateur
Service. Id.
"a H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 263.
14
Id. at 264.
Approximately 40% of the electronic spectrum is reserved
28

ment use the frequencies in a more efficient manner and transfer
some frequencies to the private sector. Id. The amendment required the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications
and Information and the Chairman of the Commission to conduct periodic joint spectrum planning on a biannual basis. Id. at
265. Furthermore, the Secretary must submit a report to Congress identifying frequencies presently assigned to the government that may be assigned to the private sector. Id.
Id. at 268.
28

for federal use. Id. at 263. The National Telecommunications
and Information Administration ("NTIA"), within the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch agency responsible
for advising the President on telecommunications and information policies. Id. Section 102 of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act ("Telecommunications Act") charged the NTIA with "[flostering full
and efficient use of the telecommunications resources . . . in a

manner which encourages the most beneficial uses thereof in the
public interest." Telecommunications Authorization Act of 1992,
Pub. L. 102-538, 106 Stat. 3533, (1992). However, the federal
government has not always employed the most efficient uses (or
spectrum efficient technologies) of their assigned frequencies.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 249.
"0 The reallocable spectrum must consist of 200 MHz below
5 GHz and up to 20 MHz may be located between 5 and 6
GHz. Id. at 266. Up to 100 MHz may be shared by the Government and FCC licensees. Id.
The Budget Act amended the Telecommunications Act by
87
adding a new "Part B - Emerging Telecommunications Technologies." Id. at 263. Congress found that the demand for radio
spectrum increased dramatically during the past fifty years due
to major advances in technology. Id. In addition, although 40%
of the radio spectrum was reserved for government use, the government was not using it efficiently. Id. Congress, therefore,
found it was in the public interest to require that the govern-

February 10, 1994.1 The frequency bands identified

as immediately available for reallocation were 23902400 MHz, 2402-2417 MHz, and 4660-4685
MHz. 2 The Commission had eighteen months from
the enactment of the Reconciliation Act (February
10, 1993) to assign services to these frequencies."3
II. ET DOCKET 94-32: THE COMMISSION
CREATES THE GENERAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
On May 4, 1994, the Commission released a Notice of Inquiry ("NOI") requesting comments on
how to assign the reallocated frequencies. 4 The
Commission's goal was "to ensure that spectrum reallocated for private sector use will provide for the
introduction of new services and the enhancement of
existing services."" It sought comment on the most
appropriate non-federal use of the bands, including

29 All of the spectrum identified for immediate reallocation
must be for exclusive non-Federal use and at least one-half must
be below 3 GHz. First Report and Order and Second NPRM,
supra note 10, at 4771 n.3.
80 NTIA recently reallocated an additional 45 MHz of spectrum from government use to private use in the 2300-2310
MHz, 2400-2402 MHz frequency bands for exclusive non-Federal use, and the 2417-2450 MHz band for mixed use. COMM.
DAILY, Oct. 2, 1995, at 6.
"' Second Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 3 (citing
NTIA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRELIMINARY SPECTRUM
ALLOCATION REPORT, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 94-27 (Feb.
1994)). On October 27, 1994, the President of the United States
notified the Chairman of the Commission that the National Table of Frequency Allocations had been modified to reflect certain
frequencies were no longer reserved for government use. First
Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note 10, at 4771
n.6.
8
Second Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 3.
88
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 6001 (a)(3).
84
In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred
from Federal Government Use, Notice of Inquiry, 9 FCC Rcd.
2175, para. 1 (1994).
Id.
88
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any suggested restrictions that should be placed on
their use. The Commission also requested that commenters discuss the needs of the public safety communications systems. 6
On November 8, 1994, the Commission released a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making proposing to allocate all three bands, the entire 50 MHz, to both
Fixed and Mobile services instead of limiting the allocation to one specific service.8 According to the
Commission, a flexible general allocation which
would allow market forces to determine the types of
services that licensees should provide would best
serve the public. 8 Also, the Commission believed
that "under [this flexible] approach most of the services to be provided in this spectrum would likely
meet the statutory criteria for auctions." 9
Ninety comments and fifty-two reply comments
were filed in response to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making.40 All but three of these commenters
opposed the Commission's proposal.4 1 However, the
Commission still proposed that "based on the record
of this proceeding . . . an approach that provides

spectrum for both unlicensed devices and Fixed and
Mobile services would best serve the public
36

Id. para. 9(f).

'7 In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred
from Federal Government Use, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 9 FCC Rcd. 6779, para. 9 (1994) [hereinafter Notice of
Proposed Rule Making].
" In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's
Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Report and
Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 1825, para. 105 (1986), recon. denied, 2
FCC Rcd. 6830 (1987). In the Cellular Report and Order, the
Commission allocated 2 MHz of spectrum in the 901-902/940941 MHz bands for a "general purpose mobile radio service."
Id. para. 1841. When making this allocation, the Commission
found nothing in Sections 303(a) - (c) to prohibit the Commission from taking "into account marketplace forces when exercising its spectrum allocation responsibilities under the public interest standard." Id. para. 1839. In the First Report and Order
and Second NPRM, the Commission recognized that the flexible
use of the spectrum in this docket was never actually licensed
and the frequency was eventually reallocated for narrowband
PCS. First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, at 4792 n.103.
"' Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 37, para. 9.
40
First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, para. 5.
41
See generally Comments of Alcatel Network Systems to
the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32
(Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Initial Alcatel Comments], Comments of American Petroleum Institute to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Initial API Comments]; Comments of AT&T Corp. to the
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec.
19, 1995); Comments of Los Angeles County Sheriff to the No-

'

interest."' 4
On February 7, 1995, the Commission adopted a
First Report and Order and Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making ("First Report and Order and
Second NPRM").43 Under its proposal, the Commission allocated the 2390-2400 MHz band for use
by unlicensed PCS." The 2402-2417 MHz band
will continue to be used by Part 15 devices'" and is
also apportioned to Amateur services,' 6 while the
4660-4685 MHz band will be used for Fixed and
Mobile services.' The Commission purported that
the public will receive the greatest benefit by allocating the band to Fixed and Mobile services whether
those services be private, non-subscriber, or subscriber based."' Licensees may provide any Fixed or
Mobile service that is not Broadcast, Radiolocation,

or Satellite service, including Mobile Satellite services. 4'9 The Commission reasoned that this broad allocation will afford licensees the opportunity to meet
the spectrum needs of consumers.5"
In response to the First R&O and Second
NPRM, many commenters argued that the Commission was not fulfilling its obligation under Section
303 of the Communications Act by utilizing this type

tice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec. 19,
1995); Comments of the Association of Public-Safety Communications to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt. No.
94-32 (Dec. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Initial APCO Comments];
Comments of The Part 15 Coalition to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec. 19, 1994); Comments
of Loral/Qualcomm Partnership, L.P. to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec. 19, 1994); Comments
of In-Flight Phone Corporation to the Notice of Proposed Rule
Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 (Dec. 19, 1994); Comments of
Bell Atlantic to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET
Dkt. No. 94-32, (Dec. 19, 1994).
4' First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, para. 6.
,' See id.
"
Id. para. 16. PCS is defined as "a family of mobile or
portable radio communications services which could provide services to individuals and business" anytime, anywhere. See In re
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 5676, para. 29 (1992).
48
Part 15 of the Commission's rules provides for the operation of unlicensed low-power devices which include, but are not
limited to, auditory assistance, biomedical telemetry, cable locating equipment, cordless telephones, television broadcast receivers
and wireless LANs. 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (1994).
46 First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, para. 32.
47
Id. para. 41.
48
Id. para. 6.
" Id. para. 60.
50

Id.

1996]

GENERAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

of allocation."' For example, the American Petroleum Institute ("API") and the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials-International,
Inc. ("APCO")5 ' both asserted that auctions should
not be used to allocate spectrum resources between
different types of services, such as Commercial and
Private, or Fixed and Mobile services." These service providers often times do not have the capital to
compete with for-profit commercial entities when
spectrum is auctioned.5 4 API asserted that by auctioning this spectrum, private users and state and local government public safety agencies were precluded
from participating; a consequence in direct contradiction to the congressional mandate." API emphasized that "[tihe [Reconciliation] Act requires the
Commission to implement an allocation and assignment plan which accounts for 'the safety of life and
property in accordance with the policies of Section 1
of the 1934 Act (47 U.S.C. § 151).' " API and The
Association for Maximum Service Television
("MSTV") proposed allocating the 4660-4685 MHz
band for broadcast auxiliary services in order to support digital advanced television and relieve congestion on the 1990-2110 MHz band.5
API submitted that there is a distinction between
allocating spectrum and awarding licenses and that
"auctions are permitted only to assign licenses, not to
determine spectrum allocations." 58 The Commission
should decide what services should be provided, and
where on the spectrum they should sit, based on the
public interest, convenience, and necessity. Awarding
81
See generally Comments of the American Petroleum Institute to the Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt.
No. 94-32, at ii, iii (Mar. 20, 1995) [hereinafter API Comments], Reply Comments of Maximum Service Television, Inc.
to the Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Dkt. No.
94-32, at 1 (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter MSTV Comments],
Comments of The Association of Public-Safety Communications

Officials-International, Inc. to the Second Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32 at 2 (Mar. 20, 1995) [hereinafter APCO Comments].
82

APCO is the nation's oldest and largest public
safety communications organization, with over
11,000 members involved in the management and
operation of law enforcement, fire, emergency med-

licenses should also be done in the public interest,
convenience and necessity, and Congress has found
that these interests can be served through the auction
process. 59
API argued that the Commission's proposal to
auction spectrum for a range of services blurs this
distinction.60 Although the FCC has limited authority to award licenses by auction when there are mutually exclusive applications," as API argues, Congress gave the Commission only limited authority to
hold auctions in order to assign licenses. This authority does not extend to the power to determine
spectrum allocations. 2
Before the Commission is permitted to award licenses by auction, it must determine that the "principal use of the spectrum will involve, or is reasonably
likely to involve the licensee receiving compensation
from subscribers." 6 MSTV suggested that the Commission had no basis in the record for asserting that
the principal use for the 4660-4685 MHz band will
be subscriber based. 64 In response, the Commission
asserted its policy of determining the principal use of
a service by comparing the amount of non-subscription use made, or likely to be made, by a licensee,
with the amount of subscriber-based use for a particular service. 65 If the subscriber-based use is likely to
be more than the non-subscriber-based use, then
spectrum for that service may be auctioned. 6 The
Commission found that it was likely that the majority of services within the GWCS would be subscriber-based.67 The Commission apparently relied
58 Id.

58 Id. at 3 (citing, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Title
VI, Part B, § 115(b)(1)(c) (1993)).
87
Initial API Comments, supra note 41, at 4; MSTV Comments, supra note 51, at 4.
58 API Comments, supra note 51, at 5; see also 47 U.S.C.
309(j)(6)(A) (1994).

H.R. Rep. No. 66.
API Comments, supra note 51, at 11.
61 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 6002.
* API Comments, supra note 51, at 2.
89
80

a

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 6002.

64

MSTV Comments, supra note 51, at 5.

68

First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note

Public Safety Pool channels.
APCO Comments, supra note 51, at 1.

10, para. 64. Competitive bidding may only be used to assign
licenses if the "principal use" of the spectrum was likely to involve the transmission or reception of communications signals to
subscribers for compensation. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(A); see
also In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Second Report and Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 2348, 2354, para. 30 (1994), recon., Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7245 (1994).

88 See API Comments, supra note 51; APCO Comments,
supra note 51.
5 See API Comments, supra note 51.

10, para. 65.
67
Id. para. 66.

ical, disaster relief, highway maintenance, forestryconservation, and other public safety communications facilities. APCO is the FCC's certified fre-

quency coordinator for the Part 90 Police Radio
Service, Local Government Radio Service, and

"

First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
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on those comments which suggested that the spectrum should be allocated for various subscriber-based
services such as wireless cable, wireless local loop
services and interactive video, among others.6 8
However, the Commission's assumption that the
principal use of the spectrum will be subscriberbased is unsubstantiated. Several commenters proposed that the spectrum will also be used for nonsubscriber based services, such as emergency services
and private microwave.69 API and APCO both asserted that the spectrum should be allocated for
emergency services and other commenters, including
Bell Atlantic, supported private services such as private dispatch and private microwave services.7 0

The House Committee Report addressing Section
309(j) states that "the FCC cannot base an allocation decision ...solely or predominantly on the ex-

pectation of more revenues. ' '7 The Commission's
proposed rules suggest that it has allocated the spectrum for GWCS and defined GWCS in a way that
would inevitably result in auctioning the spectrum.
The Commission has only excluded three services,
Broadcast, Radiolocation, and Satellite, from competitive bidding.7 2 By carving out these areas, the
Commission suggests that its purposes in making the
GWCS allocation was to ensure that it would be
subject to the auction process.
In response to this argument, the Commission asserted that this type of allocation was permissible because it was in the public's interest and, in addition,
falls within its broad discretion when allocating
spectrum. 7 3 The Commission also stated that it was
not precluded from assigning spectrum to stations for
68

Comments of Bell Atlantic to the Notice of Proposed Rule

Making in ET Dkt. No. 94-32, at 2 (Mar. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Bell Atlantic Comments]; Comments of American Telecasting, Inc. to The Second Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET
Dkt. No. 94-32, at 4-5 (Mar. 20, 1995).
" See generally MSTV Comments, supra note 51, at 5; API
Comments, supra note 51, at 4; Initial API Comments, supra
note 41, at 6; APCO Comments, supra note 51, at 2.
70 API Comments, supra note 51, at 3-4; APCO Comments,
supra note 51, at 2; Bell Atlantic Comments, supra note 68, at 5.
71 API Comments, supra note 51, at 5 (citing H.R. 103-66).
" Broadcast services are excluded from the competitive bidding process because broadcasters do not receive compensation
for transmitting their signals and, therefore, are non-subscription

based.
73 First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note

10, para. 44.
74 Id.
75 Id. (emphasis in original).
76 Second Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 1. The
Commission will issue GWCS licenses based on three different
geographic areas - National, Regional and Economic Area-like
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more than one permissible use or in a manner in
which it otherwise deemed to be in the public interest. 7 ' Indeed, nothing in the language of the Communications Act or its legislative history limits the
"Commission's discretion to prescribe the nature of
the service to be rendered over radio frequencies or
its authority to assign (or allocate) frequencies to the
7
various classes of stations. 5
On July 31, 1995 the Commission adopted its
proposal creating the GWCS and promulgated rules
for the licensing of the service in the 4660-4685
MHz band. 6 As proposed, the Commission will issue licenses under GWCS for the provision of any
service other than Broadcast, Radiolocation, and Satellite services, including the Mobile Satellite service. 77 In addition, the Commission concluded that in
light of the comments submitted, the principal use of
the spectrum under the GWCS would be for subscriber-based services; therefore, licenses for GWCS
will be 8awarded through the competitive bidding
7
process.

In response, MSTV filed comments arguing that
"GWCS will be plagued with interference problems
caused from the operation of mutually-incompatible
services. ' The Commission disagreed. The Commission asserted that GWCS will foster the efficient
use of the spectrum because licensees will be encouraged to use the spectrum under their licenses for
a variety of purposes.8 0 According to the Commission, interference problems can be resolved through
general non-interference standards and rules.8 The
Commission claimed that barring Broadcast, Radiolocation and Satellite services has eliminated several
geographic areas. Id. para. 56. Two of the five blocks will be
assigned as national licenses, one will be assigned within five

Regional Licensing areas and the remaining two will be based
on Economic Area-like service areas. Id. The Commission has
adopted the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Com-

merce's definition of Economic Areas and added three additional
areas: Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico
and the United States Virgin Islands, and America Somoa. Id.
The Commission will award a total of 875 licenses. Id. Licensees
seeking economic area-based licenses will be permitted to aggregate nationwide licenses. Id. In addition, an applicant that is a
rural telephone company may be granted a license that is geo-

graphically partitioned from a separately licensed economic area,
if the economic area applicant agrees in writing to a partition.

Id.

Second Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 12.
The Commission intends to employ simultaneous multiple
round auctions and sequential oral auctions. Id. para. 71.
" MSTV Comments, supra note 51, at 3.
80 First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, para. 14.
s Id. para. 18.
77
78
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sources of interference." Furthermore, licenses will
be granted under the condition that users do not cre8
ate unacceptable interference with other users. 3
Whether the Commission is correct is a "wait and
see" proposition.
III. FCC ALLOCATION IS BEYOND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The Reconciliation Act of 1993 required the FCC
to submit to the President and Congress a plan for
distribution of the reassigned frequencies."' This
"plan must ensure the future availability of frequencies for new technologies and services ...

and allow

for innovation and marketplace development that
may affect the relative efficiencies of different spectrum allocations.""5 Congress specifically stated that
these new amendments were not intended to preclude the Commission from "allocating the bands of
frequencies for specific purposes in future rule making proceedings [and] the Committee assume[d] that
the Commission will take into account new developments, including new technologies and services developed after the report has been submitted ...."86
Congress did not intend for the Commission to stop
allocating the spectrum for specific purposes, nor to
allow private parties to dictate the types of services
that will be provided over the electronic spectrum.
Congress intended the Commission to continue allocating spectrum to specific services, while focusing
on new
technologies
and marketplace
7
8

developments.

When Congress authorized the use of competitive
bidding for awarding licenses, the FCC was still allocating spectrum for specific services. The Commission allocated spectrum to a particular service and
then opened a filing window during which time applications for licenses to provide this service would
be accepted. Nothing in the legislative history of
competitive bidding indicates that Congress intended
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Id. at 270.
Id. at 269.
See generally H.R. Rep. No. 111.
s' Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 19.
90
See generally WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING
"
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29 (2d. ed. 1992).
91 Id.
"' Id. at 31. In Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935), the Supreme Court found that Congress had
impermissibly authorized trade associations, private bodies, to
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the FCC to change its practice of selecting services
for bands of spectrum prior to awarding licenses.8 8
Through competitive bidding, applicants would
"bid for licenses to provide specific services rather
than for a carte blanche opportunity to implement
some service of their choice on a generic spectrum
block."8 9 The Commission is using its limited authority to award licenses by auction to impermissibly
allocate spectrum. The Commission should specify
the type of service a licensee must provide on the frequency bands before it auctions licenses. As the comments above indicate, the record lacks evidence to
substantiate that the principal use of the frequencies
will be subscriber-based. To be eligible for a GWCS
license, an applicant merely must not propose to provide Broadcast, Radiolocation, or Satellite services.
The creation of the GWCS gives the appearance
that the Commission is auctioning spectrum to the
highest bidder for any service that is not one of the
taboo three, in order to increase federal revenue.
IV. FCC IS IMPERMISSIBLY DELEGATING
ITS AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE ELECTRONIC SPECTRUM TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR
In determining whether an agency action is beyond its statutory authority, a reviewing court first
must look at the agency's enabling act and determine
the agency's standard.9" Next, the court must determine to whom the agency is delegating its authority. 91 If the agency is sub-delegating to private parties, the delegation is prohibited.9"
Under the Communications Act, the FCC's enabling act, the standard the FCC must follow is to
regulate the electronic spectrum in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity." The Supreme Court has stated that in interpreting this standard the Commission must look at
develop standards ("codes") of fair competition. After the trade
associations created the codes, they were approved by the President and were binding on the entire industry. Fox, supra note
90, at 25. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
the Supreme Court found a statute permitting private groups to
create minimum wage standards for an entire industry to be unconstitutional. In 1974, in National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), the Court alluded to the Commission's burden of determining the
composition of traffic on the airways, and that it may not delegate this responsibility to individual broadcasters. The case was
subsequently remanded to the FCC for other reasons, and this
issue was never addressed further.
98 47 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq.
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the context of the situation.9" It must take into account the "nature of radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character and quality of services.' 95 Therefore, the Commission cannot
determine whether an action is within the public interest, convenience and necessity unless it knows the
type of service being provided. Under the GWCS,
the Commission only knows what services are not
being provided to the public.
The Communications Act permits the FCC to
delegate its authority to integrated bureaus, panels of
commissioners, individual commissioners, and employees.9 Nothing in the Communications Act, its
legislative history or prior case law indicates that the
Commission may delegate its responsibilities to private entities. However, through its new order, the
Commission is delegating its control over the spectrum to private parties. Licensees will determine the
services to be provided in the 4660-4685 MHz band
of spectrum. 97 The Commission has no way of
knowing whether a proposed service is within the
public's interest, convenience and necessity. By its
own rules, the Commission does not even examine
an applicant's proposed service before it awards a
license. 98
The Commission stated in the First Report and
Order and Second NPRM that it "ha[s] no intention
of abdicating [its] responsibility to provide a regulatory structure that is sufficient to provide for use of
the spectrum that is in the public interest."9 9 However, abdicating its responsibility appears to be exactly what it has done. The Commission cannot determine whether the spectrum will be used in the
public interest without knowing the identity of the
service to be 'provided.
In addition, the Commission stated that it will rely
on market forces to determine whether a particular
service is in the public's interest.1 00 Theoretically, a
service not required by the public and not supported
by the public will not survive competition. The "in" National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 990,
1009 (1943).
9

Id. at 1009.

47 U.S.C. § 155(b) (1994); see also United States v. Cottman Co., 190 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
903 (1952) (subdelegation may be made only to a government
official or to someone employed by the agency in question).
9' First Report and Order and Second NPRM, supra note
10, para. 52.
98 Id. para. 65.
09 Id. para. 45.
100 Id. para. 72.
101 Ellen P. Goodman, Superhighway Patrol: Why the FCC
Must Police the Airwaves, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995 at, C-6.
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visible hand" of the marketplace is not sufficient to
ensure that the radio spectrum is managed in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. 1
Although the Commission is permitted to take
market forces into account when allocating the spectrum, it cannot allow market forces to dictate spectrum allocations.' There are many factors the FCC
must take into account when it allocates spectrum.
For example, radio interference is a very common
problem between licensees. When the FCC allocates
spectrum it takes into account different services and
how their differing technologies work, or do not
work, when placed adjacent to one another.' 0 8
One purpose of the Communications Act is "to
maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of radio transmission . . . ."'" The FCC
must retain control of the spectrum in order to keep
some semblance of order between the different services. Standardization of services is essential to maintaining spectrum order and efficiency.
An example of the importance of standardized services is cellular telephone service. The Commission
made a nationwide allocation of the 824-849 MHz
and 869-894 MHz frequency bands for cellular services.' 0 5 By doing so, cellular licensees have had the
opportunity to enter into agreements to share their
spectrum with other cellular licensees.'0 6 If there
was a cellular service operating at 824 MHz in Baltimore, Maryland, and a paging service was operating on this same band in Richmond, Virginia, the
cellular user would interfere with the paging user if
the cellular user tried to use her cell phone in Richmond. These sharing arrangements allow users to
roam beyond their operators' designated service areas. Today's technology does not allow different services to simultaneously utilize frequencies in a given
area. Therefore, these sharing arrangements are the
most efficient way to use spectrum. Sharing arrangements will not be widely available under GWCS.
10
108

Id.

Id.

47 U.S.C. § 301.
'5 Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 6, at 19.
10 For example, if a cellular user has a home base in Baltimore, Maryland, and she wishes to travel to Richmond, Virginia, her cellular carrier may not have cell cites in that area.
Cellular licensees have agreed to contract with other cellular
licensees to permit users to "roam" throughout the country. If
cellular licensees did not all operate on the same frequencies nationwide, this roaming would not be possible. See generally In re
Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of the Communications
Act's Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, FurtherNotice
of Proposed Rule Making, 9 FCC Rcd. 2863 (1994).
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The Commission has stated time and time again in
its Orders that this "flexible" spectrum allocation
will foster an efficient use of the spectrum. 107 Failing
to account for shared spectrum plans by licensees is
not an efficient use of the spectrum.
There is nothing in the Communications Act that
limits the Commission's discretion in placing a new
technology in an already occupied spectrum band.
The Commission reallocated private microwave
licensees when it determined that PCS would work
more efficiently in that band of spectrum.'0 8 The
same could be done if the Commission assigned a
specific service to the 4660-4685 MHz band and
then determined another service would better serve
the public interest.
The Commission is relying on the private sector
and private licensees to utilize the spectrum in a
manner consistent with the public interest. No evidence exists to support a conclusion that private entities will necessarily act in the public interest simply
because these licensees have purchased very expensive licenses in order to make money. Inventing and
implementing new services is both lucrative and precarious. In addition, it is an unsupported assumption
that entities who have won licenses are interested in
providing new technologies or in using the spectrum
to enhance services already in existence unless it
would be to their economic benefit. It is the Commission's responsibility to set aside spectrum for new
services and ensure that these new services will serve
the public interest.
V.

CONCLUSION

By creating the General Wireless Communications Service and licensing it through competitive
bidding the Commission has impermissibly delegated
its control of the radio spectrum to the private sector.
The Commission has a responsibility to ensure the
spectrum is used in an efficient manner. Because the
See generally First Report and Order and Second
NPRM, supra note 10, para. 48; Second Report and Order,
supra note 7, para. 12.
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government was not using its spectrum efficiently,
Congress ordered them to reallocate it for non-government use. Unfortunately, the Commission is not
allocating the spectrum in an efficient manner. Standardizing services on assigned frequencies would
permit licensees to share spectrum. However, the
Commission has chosen not to standardize the services and will allow licensees to provide any service
they wish as long as it is not a Broadcast, Radiolocation or Satellite service.
When Congress mandated reallocation of the spectrum for non-government use, it required that the
Commission take into account the need for public
safety and emergency services. The Commission has
ignored the comments filed by APCO and API
which address the need for additional spectrum so
that existing safety and emergency services may be
improved. Instead, the Commission has chosen to
auction the spectrum for a broad range of uses,
which effectively prevents these safety-oriented organizations from acquiring licenses. These organizations generally do not have the capital to compete for
licenses with large for-profit corporations.
The Commission's new trend seems to be to sell
spectrum to the highest bidder, and permit that licensee to provide any service it desires as long as the
principal use of the service is likely to be subscriberbased. The Communications Act specifically states
that the FCC is responsible for maintaining the
spectrum in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The Commission
needs to reexamine its definition of "maintaining the
spectrum." It should include more than a sale to the
highest bidder. The Commission seems to be interested more in auctioning spectrum and recovering
funds for the Federal Treasury than in regulating
the electronic spectrum. The Commission is the policing agent in charge of the radio spectrum, not a
collection agency for the United States Government.
In re Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innova-

tion in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7162, para. 1 (1993).

